Insuring the uninsurable : brokers and incomplete insurance contracts by Doherty, Neil A. & Muermann, Alexander
 
 
 
 
No. 2005/24 
Insuring the Uninsurable: 
Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts 
 
Neil A. Doherty and Alexander Muermann 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
Center for Financial Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Center for Financial Studies is a nonprofit research organization, supported by an 
association of more than 120 banks, insurance companies, industrial corporations and 
public institutions. Established in 1968 and closely affiliated with the University of 
Frankfurt, it provides a strong link between the financial community and academia. 
The CFS Working Paper Series presents the result of scientific research on selected top-
ics in the field of money, banking and finance. The authors were either participants in 
the Center´s Research Fellow Program or members of one of the Center´s Research Pro-
jects. 
If you would like to know more about the Center for Financial Studies, please let us 
know of your interest. 
 
    
Prof. Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen  Prof. Volker Wieland, Ph.D. * We wish to thank Christian Laux, Georg Noeldeke, Soenje Reiche and seminar participants at the Risk Theory Society 
meeting 2005 and the Center for Financial Studies for valuable comments. 
 
1 Department of Insurance and Risk Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302, USA, email: doherty@wharton.upenn.edu 
 
2 Department of Insurance and Risk Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302, USA, email: muermann@wharton.upenn.edu. 
 
CFS Working Paper No. 2005/24 
Insuring the Uninsurable: 
Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts* 
 
Neil A. Doherty
1 and Alexander Muermann
2 
 
 
 
September 2005 
 
 
Abstract:  
How do markets spread risk when events are unknown or unknowable and where not 
anticipated in an insurance contract? While the policyholder can “hold up” the insurer for extra 
contractual payments, the continuing gains from trade on a single contract are often too small 
to yield useful coverage. By acting as a repository of the reputations of the parties, we show 
the brokers provide a coordinating mechanism to leverage the collective hold up power of 
policyholders. This extends both the degree of implicit and explicit coverage. The role is 
reflected in the terms of broker engagement, specifically in the ownership by the broker of the 
renewal rights. Finally, we argue that brokers can be motivated to play this role when they 
receive commissions that are contingent on insurer profits. This last feature questions a recent, 
well publicized, attack on broker compensation by New York attorney general, Elliot Spitzer. 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: G22, G24, L14 
 
 
Keywords: Incomplete Insurance Contracts, Brokerage, Contingent Commissions, Reputation 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Our objective is to show how insurance markets can provide an orderly mechanism by which policyholders
can receive transfers for losses that are non veriﬁable and, possibly were never anticipated when coverage was
written. Given the pace of technical, social and legal change, such fuzzy risks are cropping up with some
frequency. Examples include the asbestos claims that have cost the insurance industry tens of billions of
dollars, the sudden appearance of toxic mold in insurer claims, various forms of "cyber loss", and possibly the
9/11 losses which, despite the war exclusion on many policies, were not disputed by insurers and reinsurers.
We will show that brokers play a central role in extending insurance markets to cover non-veriﬁable losses.
A clue to the role of brokers lies in their contractual arrangement with insurers.1 It is normal for brokers
to “own the renewal rights” on the book of business they place with the insurer. This means that the
broker has the renewal rights to the policies it places with that insurer. The broker is free to recommend
to its clients that they renew with the current insurer or switch to a rival. Contrary, the insurer revokes
any right to direct solicitation of business places through the broker. This provision vests the broker with
considerable hold up power. Why would brokers seek this hold up power, how would they exercise it and
why would insurers choose to vest this power in the broker?
In our model, insurance contracts are written that cover veriﬁable losses. However, non veriﬁable losses
also can arise. Brokers then encourage insurers to make transfers for the non veriﬁable losses, against the
threat that the business will be withdrawn and the future rents lost to the insurer. In this way, the market
for risk transfer is extended to include losses that are not contractible. For their part, insurers are willing
to expose their reputations to this hold up threat because they can extract rents from the extended informal
coverage. For the broker’s part, they can participate in those rents and, indeed, a proﬁt based commission
will make the threats they hold over insurers credible.2
Previous literature has stressed several roles for brokers including search agents who match trading
1Ironically, it is the completeness of the broker-insurer contract that supports the incompleteness of the insurance contract
that we now describe.
2Some observers have noticed a trend towards the ex post negotiation of claims. Apparently, insurers are now more likely
to dispute large claims, to oﬀer less than 100 cents on the dollar, or to try to get away without paying. Richard and Barbara
Stewart (2001) have labeled this the "loss of certainty eﬀect" and Kenneth Abraham (2001) has talked of the "de facto big
claims exclusion". One reason for such disputes is that large claims threaten insurer solvency and such oﬀers may be seen to
resemble workouts in which distressed non-insurance ﬁrms negotiate with creditors. But the issue here is with the willingness,
not the ability, to pay. These writers see the "big claims exclusion" as degradation of the insurance market because risk-averse
consumers will place a lower value on such uncertain insurance. Indeed, they see a potential downward spiral of the insurance
market if this practice continues. Contrary, we argue that ex post negotiation might represent an expansion of the insurance
market to include transfer for non veriﬁable losses.
2partners (e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987) and information intermediaries who are able to transmit
credible information and thereby lower costs of adverse selection (Biglaiser, 1993). In addition to these
roles, we show that brokers act as a clearing house of the reputations of insurers. This role enables
brokers to “hold up” insurers for ex post reasonable transfers for non veriﬁable losses. Given appropriate
compensation, brokers can exercise a credible threat to insurers which leads to more complete insurance
markets. Our work parallels that of Kingston (2005) who shows that brokers can help sustain cooperation
in markets where lack of trust can lead to a prisoner’s dilemma in which parties default on their trades. This
examination of brokers is topical. Brokers have been assailed recently by the New York attorney general,
Elliot Spitzer, and at the center of this assault is the compensation structure for brokers. Contrary to
Spitzer’s assertions, we will show that the compensation structures criticized by Spitzer, can lead to real
beneﬁt to policyholders.
1.1 Non-Veriﬁable Losses
At the heart of our paper are non-veriﬁable or non-contractible events. By these we mean events that are
incapable of inclusion in the policy because they can not be anticipated; or events which are simply too
complex to include in the contract, or events or circumstances which could be included but, due to time
inconsistency or the prospect of new information, the parties believe it preferable to bargain after the fact.3
Non-veriﬁable losses can also refer to the size or cause of the loss. An insurance policy might be speciﬁc
about how a claim is to be settled (damage to a home or its contents might be limited to the repair cost
or the cost of replacement with something of similar condition), but the insurer and insured might wish to
leave open the possibility that settlement can be more generous as idiosyncratic circumstances dictate, or
less generous if there is suspicion of claim fraud (which is diﬃcult to prove).
Consider unanticipated losses. The parties consider the possibility that some unanticipated losses might
occur. These unanticipated losses are not insurable in a formal contract because they cannot be speciﬁed
and, even if they could be speciﬁed, they might be unsuited to insurance perhaps because they would
incite severe ex post moral hazard, or because they are undiversiﬁable. However, there is another class of
unanticipated losses for which, had they been anticipated, the parties would concur that they are insurable.
3Some policies specify the perils and losses that are covered. If a loss occurs that is not speciﬁed, then it is not covered.
Other policies work in the opposite direction, they cover everything that is not included. The latter does provide a structure
for including the unanticipated, but does so at a cost — it is open ended and becomes very diﬃcult to price. Moreover, having
such open policies complicates the insurer’s ﬁnancial and risk management.
3Let us simply describe these as ex post insurable.4 If the parameters by which they could be deemed ex post
insurable could be pre-speciﬁed, then there is nothing to prevent the parties from conditioning the insurance
on these parameters. For example, suppose that the only thing that separated an ex post insurable from
an ex post uninsurable event, was diversiﬁcation. An ex post insurable event might be one that hit only
one policyholder but an event impacting many policyholders would be ex post uninsurable. If things were
this simple, a contract could be written conditioning coverage on the insurer’s surplus (rather like a mutual
contract). But the circumstances that determine whether an event is ex post insurable may not be that easy
to pre-specify or that easy to anticipate. For example, consider toxic mold, which burst onto the insurance
scene as an unanticipated loss recently. Not only can it be an undiversiﬁable loss but, going forward, its
coverage carries signiﬁcant moral hazard. The fear is that insurance may be seen as a substitute for proper
repair and maintenance of property. It may not be practical to write into contracts enforceable exclusions
based, not only on the peril which is unanticipated, but on the moral hazard it might engender. Table 1
illustrates the criteria often listed in insurance textbooks for insurability (the loss is anticipated, measurable,
etc.) and suggests how such factors might determine whether an unanticipated loss is ex post insurable.
Thus we suggest that a surprise event may be insurable going forward if it is measurable (ex post), there is
low correlation, low moral hazard, and information is symmetrically distributed between the parties.
Classiﬁcation of Losses Ex ante insurable Ex post insurable Ex post uninsurable
Anticipated Yes No No
Measurable Yes No No
Observable Yes Yes No
Low correlation Yes Yes No
Low moral hazard Yes Yes No
Symmetric information Yes Yes No
Table 1
4Berliner (1982) deﬁnes insurable losses as satisfying the following criteria. Losses are anticipated, measurable and, after
the fact observable. There must be low correlation and little moral hazard or adverse selection. Losses that are not anticipated
but satisfy the other conditions are considered ex post insurable.
41.2 Examples of Incomplete Insurance Contracts
Consider the following examples of incomplete contracts. The ﬁrst involves reinsurance. Traditionally, the
reinsurance market has been considered to be one based on relationships. Contracts were not very detailed
and relationships between the insurer and reinsurer tended to persist over many years. In this relationship,
the parties link their fortunes. If an unusual or uncovered loss arises, the reinsurer will often pay without
raising a fuss. But there is a corresponding obligation of “payback”. The payback feature makes the
contract something like a debt contract. Jean-Baptiste and Santomero (2000) argue that long term implicit
contracts are eﬃcient because they allow evolving information to be included in pricing. But reinsurance
contracts may be incomplete in other ways. Contracts rarely specify the underwriting and claims settlement
practices to be adopted by the primary insurer. The reinsurer will usually monitor the relationship but
permit the primary insurer considerable ﬂexibility in exploiting its core skills. Finally, reinsurance contracts
often are not as speciﬁci nd e ﬁning coverage as are the direct policies from which they are derived. This
allows some ex post ﬂexibility for the reinsurer to respond to losses that may not be covered. For example,
despite the war exclusion on many reinsurance policies, reinsurers uniformly responded to the 9/11 losses of
their primary insurance clients without seeking to evoke this exclusion.
The feature of the reinsurance market that is of particular interest here is the presence of brokers. If
a reinsurer behaves badly to the primary insurer, the broker will know of it. The consequence for the
reinsurer might be not only a loss of that contract, but a diversion of other business from the broker to other
reinsurers. This leveraging of reputation enhances the “hold-up” power of the primary insurer.5
The second example of contract incompleteness lies in the procedures used to inaugurate coverage in the
brokered reinsurance and high-end commercial insurance markets. Coverage is often syndicated across a
number of carriers. To set this in place, the broker approaches a number of insurers asking for a commitment
to provide coverage for a portion of the risk. To make such a commitment, the underwriter signs a binder (or
slip at Lloyds) indicating how much coverage is oﬀered. The interesting thing about this binder is the lack
of speciﬁcity about the coverage.6 Sometimes, the binder will refer to a particular policy form indicating
5While we are stressing the relationships in the reinsurance markets, there are signs of an apparent shift to a more com-
moditized approach, which is highlighted by, though not conﬁned to, insurance securitization. In contrast to relationship-based
transactions, insurance securitizations are embodied in precise contractual form leaving little room for discretionary performance
and ex post bargaining.
6In a dispute between the leaseholders and insurers of the World Trade Center, the central issue is whether there was one
“occurrence” or two. This is of importance because policies had not been issued at the time of the loss and coverage oﬀered
under binders was speciﬁc enough to give policy limits per occurrence but not speciﬁc enough to avoid dispute as to the meaning
of “occurrence”. Had a policy been issued, then there would have probably been a precise deﬁnition of the term.
5the general form of coverage. Other times the binder will simply commit the underwriter to the same type
of coverage oﬀered by another insurer. But sometimes, the coverage is still to be agreed. This practice
permits coverage to be arranged, or renewed without waiting for the contract to be issued. Coverage need
not be delayed pending the agreement of all contract details. The potential downside is that the lack of
speciﬁcity oﬀers leeway for dispute.
As a third illustration of incomplete insurance, some insurers such as Chubb Insurance company, have
made and protected a reputation for going the “extra mile” to ensure its personal (and other) policyholders
are happy with their claims settlements. The strategy is to resolve ambiguity over amount or coverage more
in the policyholder’s favor. Thus, there is a willingness to go beyond the narrow limits of the contract to
ensure that the policyholder is adequately compensated. This ﬂexibility introduces a degree of contract
incompleteness, which is resolved after the fact in the claim negotiation. Chubb’s distribution system is a
set of independent agents and brokers. These intermediaries “own” the renewal rights and can advise clients
to move business if they become unhappy with Chubb’s claims performance. Chubb entrusts its reputation
to these agents and brokers in order to pre-commit to a “policyholder friendly” claim settlement strategy.
In each of these illustrations, the relationship is brokered. This is important in shaping the discretion the
parties can exercise. For example, suppose Chubb fails to make a suitably generous oﬀer to settle a claim,
despite the fact that it promotes itself in this basis and charges higher premiums to cover such settlements.
The broker can now exercise discretion in its response.7 If it suspects that the claim is fraudulent or inﬂated,
it might condone Chubb’s lowball oﬀer or refusal to pay. On the other hand, if the broker believes that
Chubb is failing to meet the reasonable expectations of a deserving policyholder, it might withdraw business
from Chubb. Thus, the reputation costs to Chubb from its unsatisfactory claim oﬀer could be very high.
There is a corresponding mechanism to discipline the policyholder. If the policyholder plays fast and loose
on its claims, the broker may withdraw its services — indeed the broker’s reputation with insurers is one of
its most valuable assets and brokers may have a ﬁnancial incentive to drop troublesome policyholders.
Alternatively, suppose insurance was oﬀered on a binder but this minimal document was not speciﬁc
in the terms of coverage. A loss occurs before the policy is issued and the insurer baulks on payment.
7Kingston, 2005, gives a parallel example of 18th century marine insurance in England. Given slowness of communications,
captains of vessels were given considerable leeway in changing routs and even return cargoes. Thus, marine contracts were largely
incomplete and this incompleteness extended to insurance contracts. As Kingston notes, “reputation was key” to successful
underwriting and quotes a contemporary broker that “the private underwriters will settle a loss for a man of character, where
they will not for a man who they suspect.
6In choosing how to react to this breakdown, the broker must decide whether the event was one which, in
principle, is insurable and which a reasonable person would be expected to be covered. If the answer is
aﬃrmative, the broker might extract a large reputation toll from the insurer. But, if the policyholder “is
trying it on” — to hold up the insurer to pay for a loss that is not an insurable loss (e.g. poor business
performance) — the broker will not impose a reputation cost on the insurer for refusing to pay.
By acting as a guardian of reputations, the broker can help secure a market for non-contractible losses.
The formal and informal incentive structure for the broker reinforces this value-creating role. There is
some ambiguity as to whether an insurance broker is the agent of the policyholder or of the insurer. The
policyholder chooses whether to seek the services of a broker who will advise on insurance, on the choice
of insurers, and will place contracts with speciﬁc insurers. The policyholder also is concerned with the
treatment of its claims and usually expects the broker to become involved. The broker’s involvement can
range from a monitoring of the settlement to exerting pressure on the insurer to go beyond the strict contract
wording. Thus, the ability of the broker to create a market for non-veriﬁable losses will enhance the demand
for its services. The issue of legal agency is clouded by the payment for the service and by the incentives
this creates. The normal structure is for the broker to receive a commission from the insurer based on
the premium. However, many policyholders, particular large commercial clients, negotiate a fee with the
broker (for which the proportional commission is an oﬀset) related to the perceived value added. Such an
arrangement provides a mechanism for the broker to be directly rewarded for creating insurance coverage
for non-veriﬁable losses and for disciplining insurers that behave poorly towards their policyholders.
But brokers also act on behalf of insurers. Insurers often have contingent fees for brokers under which
an additional compensation is paid to the broker based on the revenues and/or proﬁtability of the book of
business the broker holds with the insurer. Insurers typically compete amongst each other in the design
of these proﬁt and revenue sharing schemes and there is evidence that brokers do indeed respond to these
incentives in their placement and cancellation decisions, (see Wilder, 2002).
In our formal model below, brokers respond to these bilateral incentives in the following way. Brokers
oﬀer an implicit deal to policyholders that they will use their leverage over insurers when unusual claims
arise. For their part, insurers understand that such leverage will be used and that this adds value for the
policyholder. Thus, insurers price for this eﬀect. When a veriﬁable loss occurs it is paid according to the
contract. When a non-veriﬁable loss arises, the broker determines whether the loss is ex post insurable or
7not. If the broker determines the loss to be ex post insurable, the insurer and policyholder negotiate for
a settlement. If the insurer fails to make a reasonable oﬀer, the broker inﬂicts reputation penalty on the
insurer. With such a breakdown, the broker no longer feels that its clients are getting good service from
this insurer and it diverts business to rivals or extracts concessions from the misbehaving insurer in the form
of lower future prices on the business it places. If the broker determines the loss to be ex post uninsurable,
no claim is made. The broker could also inﬂict a reputation penalty on the policyholder for trying to push
an ex post uninsurable loss onto the insurer. For example, if the broker feels that the loss is due to fraud,
or is unreasonably inﬂated (i.e., uninsurable), the broker could inﬂict a reputation cost on the policyholder.
The broker now is less willing to represent such policyholders because they may hurt its contingent fees from
the insurer or compromise its reputation with the insurer and therefore its ability to place higher quality
policyholders.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the literature on costly state veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation in the way that observability
and/or veriﬁability of states of the world is restricted which impacts the types of “contracts” that can be
written.8 The literature on costly state veriﬁcation (Townsend, 1979, Bond and Crocker, 1997) considers
situations in which (some) states are only observable to the policyholder but that the insurer can verify
these state ex-post at a cost. After a claim is ﬁled, the insurer now has the choice to audit the claim. A
“contract” is then represented by a premium, a veriﬁcation set which speciﬁes those claims to be monitored,
and a transfer from the insurer contingent on the policyholder’s claim and the auditing outcome. The
literature on costly state falsiﬁcation (Crocker and Morgan, 1998) considers situations in which states are
also only observable to the policyholder but they cannot be veriﬁed at any cost. It is, however, costly to the
policyholder to falsify claims. Ex-ante, the policyholder and insurer sign a “contract” specifying a premium
and an ex-post transfer from the insurer contingent on the policyholder’s claim. In all these models, full
8Our paper also relates to the literature on implicit risk sharing (e.g. Kimball, 1988, and Kocherlakota, 1996). These papers
are applicable to village communities (e.g. farmers, Kimball) or to two households (Kocherlakota) where individuals are in close
contact and information about defect becomes easily known (e.g. through a blacklist). It is assumed that no future trade will
take place once a party defects and this thread is assumed to be credible. Our paper is diﬀerent in two ways. First, we assume
that an institutional structure, the insurance market, is in place to organize risk sharing. We then address the question how risk
sharing can be extended to include non contractible events? In contrast to the papers above, we thus look at the coexistence
of explicit and implicit risk sharing which leads to interesting interactions. Second, we show how risk sharing can be improved
through the broker serving as a coordination mechanism. This allows for scenarios in which information does not ﬂow easily,
i.e. outside village communities. Interestingly, not only can the broker improve implicit but also explicit risk sharing.
8coverage cannot be achieved as either the veriﬁcation cost to the insurer or the falsiﬁcation cost to the
policyholder is embodied in the equilibrium contract. In both approaches, it is assumed that the transfer
schedule is enforceable in front of a court. In this paper,w ei n v e s t i g a t es i t u a t i o n sw i t ha ne v e nh i g h e rd e g r e e
of “incompleteness”, namely events that do not allow for any transfer schedules to be enforceable ex-post by
a court. The insurer has no contractual obligation to indemnify the policyholder ex-post. The mechanism
we present in this paper is based on the hold-up power the policyholder derives from future rents that the
insurer is able to extract from an ongoing relationship. As those rents are costly, i.e. the policyholder has
to pay an implicit loading, full coverage is precluded by this mechanism. The broker’s ex-post judgement
and leverage inﬂuences the size of hold-up and so aﬀects the transfers from the insurer to the policyholder.
The role of the broker in our model in some ways resembles the role of the courts in Anderlini et al (2003
a, b ) . 9 Both courts and brokers must exercise judgment in deciding whether an unanticipated loss should be
covered under the contract and in both cases they are guided by the eﬃciency gains this “precedent” implies
for future contracts. In Anderlini et al, the court’s desire for eﬃciency gain is implied by its adoption of
a social welfare function. In our model, brokers seek future eﬃciency gain because they can capture rents
directly from value added. However, there are diﬀerences. In our case, there is a modeled eﬃciency gain
in the current period. The parties can choose to contract with one or another of a number of competing
brokers. In making this choice, the degree of hold up, and therefore the terms of ex post bargaining, can
be bounded by the parties. The second diﬀerence lies in the nature and expertise of the institutions. The
nature of the ex post judgment (whether a revealed loss is ex post insurable) is technically quite complex.
Courts, by their nature, have no core skills to address such problems and rely on the expertise imported
by the parties in an adversary process. Brokers do have these core skills and derive rents directly from
the creation of value. But perhaps the biggest diﬀerence between our model and theirs lies in its purpose.
Whereas they address unanticipated events that frustrate the purpose or outcome of a contract (i.e., they
are an unintended nuisance), we address a situation where the parties know unanticipated events can happen
and we are trying to expand the domain of the contracting relationship to encompass such events (i.e., to
provide insurance). This is why, for us, it is important to address eﬃciency gains in the current period.
Perhaps, most closely related is the contemporaneous paper of Kingston (2005). He considers an economy
where people can defect on trades. In a single period, this is a prisoner’s dilemma. However, in a repeated
9The papers of Anderlini et al. and ours both build on the incomplete contract literature (see Grossman and Hart, 1986,
Hart and Moore, 1990, Hart, 1995).
9game, traders may be disinclined to default if their reputation damage prevents gains from future trades.
Without intermediaries, the dissemination of information on defaults may be limited and the reputation
sanctions correspondingly small. However, if trades are conducted through intermediaries (without contact
between buyer and seller) the intermediaries can act as a clearing house for information. Given frequent
interaction of each party with the broker, the sanction for default can be enhanced thereby lowering the
incentive to cheat. We also use intermediaries as a clearing house for information on performance and allow
the broker to impose a sanction for non performance. The diﬀerence lies mostly in objective. Whereas
Kingston is looking generally for an operative mechanism to promote trust when contracts cannot be enforced,
we are focused on the insurance market. Thus, we look in detail at the structure of the partially complete
contracts and market relationships that permit transfers to be made for non veriﬁable losses. Moreover,
instead of assuming a “nuclear” trigger for sanctions, we look at how information is updated and how brokers
are compensated to see whether threatened sanctions are indeed credible.
3“ I n s u r i n g ” N o n - V e r i ﬁable Losses without Brokers
In this section, we consider a simple world with a risk-averse individual and multiple, risk-neutral insurers.
The individual is endowed with initial wealth w0 and exposed to a loss, L, with probability p.T h e l o s s
may be veriﬁable (and therefore insurable under a conventional policy) with a probability q or non-veriﬁable
but ex-post insurable with a probability 1 − q. The non-veriﬁable loss is observed by both the individual
and the insurer, but cannot be contracted upon. For example, this may be a loss that could not have
been anticipated at the time the contract was written but, once it has occurred, it is clearly observed by all
parties.10
Now consider the following inﬁnite period problem. The individual buys a contract from a competitive
insurer to cover an amount c of the veriﬁable loss (probability pq). However, the premium exceeds the
actuarial value of the veriﬁable loss, P>p q c . Now suppose that the insurer expects that the policyholder
will renew this coverage indeﬁnitely. With these renewal expectations, the insurer would make rent having
ap r e s e n tv a l u eo f(P − pqc)/r where r is the discount rate.
The expected rent only will be realized if the policyholder does renew the contract. This “hoped-for”
10For simplicity, we will assume that all non-veriﬁable losses are ex-post insurable. The addition of ex-post uninsurable risks
to our model would create a background risk.
10rent provides “hold up” power to the policyholder. Suppose a non-veriﬁable loss occurs. The size of the
loss is L, but the policyholder believes (for reasons we will examine presently) it would be appropriate for
the insurer to make a non-contractual payment of b to the policyholder. Would the insurer be willing to
make a non-contractual payment for this non-veriﬁable loss in order to retain the customer and secure these
future rents?
We start by assuming that the policyholder has a prior expectation that the insurer will indeed make
a payment of b for a non-veriﬁable loss. At inception, the policyholder has the same prior for any insurer
from whom it might write the contract, but the policyholder selects one, the incumbent. All insurers charge
the same premium. If a non-veriﬁable loss arises and the insurer makes a payment, the policyholder’s
prior for such payment in the future from this insurer is revised upwards. Thus, the posterior that the
generous incumbent will make such settlements in the future is higher than for potential rivals. Given that
all insurers charge the same premium going forward, the policyholder chooses to renew the policy with the
incumbent. However, if the insurer does not pay the non-veriﬁable loss, the policyholder revises the prior
downwards. Thus, the posterior for the incumbent is below the prior for rivals and, given the same premium,
the policyholder will switch to a rival.
Any possible subgame perfect equilibrium to this game must involve either
1. insurers charge a premium in excess of the expected value of veriﬁable losses, P>p q c , and will choose
to make a payment, b, should a non-veriﬁable loss occur. To ensure that expectations are met in
equilibrium, the prior that such payment will be made is one; or
2. insurers charge a premium which just covers the expected value of the veriﬁable loss, P = pqc.F o r
these insurers, the prior is zero.
Consider now a steady state in which, in any future year, policyholders might have an expectation that
ap a y m e n to fb will be made against the unveriﬁable loss. In this case, future rents are reduced by the
expectations of future “type-b” payment. Thus, assuming b to be constant over time, the insurer will make
the payment, b,o n l yi fb is less than future rents discounted at the interest rate r, i.e. if
b ≤
P − pqc − p(1 − q)b
r
.
If the policyholder has all the bargaining power, then the premium P which includes future “type-b”
11payment is given by
P = pqc + p(1 − q)b + rb.
T h ep r e m i u mi st h es u mo ft h ea c t u a r i a l l yf a i rv a l u e ,pqc + p(1 − q)b, and a loading, rb. This loading
represents the future rents that provides the insurer with the incentive to pay the transfer b in case of a
unveriﬁable loss.
Would the policyholder and insurer wish to engage in this partially incomplete contract in which there
is conventional insurance coverage together with the ability of the policyholder to hold-up the insurer to
pay non veriﬁable, and therefore not contracted losses? If so, then such an arrangement provides explicit
insurance for contractible losses and implicit insurance for the non-veriﬁable (non-contractible) losses.
Proposition 1 In the model outlined above, it is optimal for the policyholder to partially insure both types
of losses and to buy more coverage on the veriﬁable than to implicitly generate on the non-veriﬁable event,
i.e. b∗ <c ∗ <Lfor all r. Furthermore, there exists a critical discount rate ¯ r>0 such that it is optimal
to generate a transfer if the discount rate is below ¯ r and not to generate a transfer otherwise, i.e. b∗ > 0 if
r<¯ r and b∗ =0if r ≥ ¯ r.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
For r<¯ r, we thus have a subgame perfect equilibrium where insurers charge a premium in excess of the
expected value of veriﬁable losses and will choose to make a payment for a non-veriﬁable loss. Policyholders
have a prior of one that such payment will be made. For all r ≥ ¯ r, we have a subgame perfect equilibrium
where only veriﬁable events are covered and policyholders have a prior of zero that payments for non-veriﬁable
losses are made.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. In order to generate a “hold-up” and thereby payments
for unveriﬁable losses, the policyholder has to pay a loading rb. The premium is therefore unfair and full
“insurance” of the unveriﬁable loss is not optimal.11 Purchasing full coverage of the veriﬁable loss would
then lead to a higher marginal utility in the state of the unveriﬁable event. The policyholder thus ﬁnds
it optimal to transfer wealth into that state by not buying full coverage of the veriﬁable loss and thereby
reducing the premium. Last, the discount rate measures the level of the loading, rb, and for high discount
rates the policyholder will ﬁnd it optimal to not generate the transfer b.
11The result still holds if there is only a non-veriﬁable loss, i.e. if q =0 , and is therefore robust with respect to diﬀerent
correlation structures between the veriﬁable and unveriﬁable loss.
124“ I n s u r i n g ” N o n - V e r i ﬁable Losses with Brokers
In the bilateral model above, the policyholder could hold up the insurer for a payment against the non-
veriﬁable loss, by threatening to withdraw his/her future business. This implies that, for the hold up to
result in a positive transfer, future rents must be strictly positive. Indeed, the risk averse policyholder is
willing to endow the insurer with positive rent in order to create a mechanism to hedge the non-veriﬁable
loss as long as the interest rate is not too high.
The problem with this model is that it results in either a very small transfer, because future proﬁts on the
policy are small, or that the policyholder must bestow very large rents on the insurer in order to get a useful
level of coverage for potentially large losses. In principal, we can mitigate this trade oﬀ between coverage
and rent, by changing the information assumptions. Instead of allowing only the policyholder to observe
the settlement, b, we allow all transfers to be observed by all the insurer’s policyholders. With similar
assumptions about beliefs, (i.e., all policyholders upgrade (downgrade) their priors about future settlements,
when the incumbent makes (fails to make) a settlement of b∗
br )t h e na l lt h eﬁrm’s policyholders would switch
insurers if the insurer failed to pay b∗
br for any one of them suﬀering a loss. This increases the hold up power
of the claimant which allows larger coverage to be obtained for non-veriﬁable losses, whilst keeping the rent
contribution in each premium fairly low.
The enhanced model outlined in the previous paragraph suggests that brokers may not be strictly nec-
essary to create a market for non-veriﬁable losses. However, the informational assumptions are strong; all
policyholders must observe all of the incumbent insurers claim payments to all policyholders and be prepared
to switch if even one policyholder is denied. We clearly need some coordination mechanism to harness the
hold-up power of multiple policyholders, while permitting the insurer to extract rents for exposing itself to
this ex-post hold up. We present the insurance broker as the coordinating device.
There are multiple agents of three types: risk-averse policyholders, risk-neutral insurers, and brokers.
Each policyholder initially secures a broker to arrange insurance and oﬀers a compensation, k, to the broker
which we assume to be a linear function of the insurer’s rent. This compensation ensures that the broker has
an ex ante interest in securing an incomplete contract with expectations of a settlement for non-veriﬁable
losses (recall that these rents provide the ex post hold up power from which the settlement is made).
Suppose that each broker arranges incomplete contracts between m such policyholders and an incumbent
insurer. Such contracts will oﬀer explicit coverage of c∗
br for veriﬁable losses and an expected settlement of
13b∗
br for non veriﬁable. Brokers can advise policyholders to move that business and thereby extract a penalty
from the incumbent insurer for failure to make an appropriate payment for a non-veriﬁable loss. Each
policyholder observes its settlement of a non-veriﬁable claim, or the broker’s penalty on the insurer if it is
not paid. Since each insurer has portfolio with each broker, the broker’s reputation for enforcing (failing to
enforce) penalty quickly becomes known to all insurers. If the broker is known not to apply a penalty, then
the insurer makes future payment of bbr =0 .
Initially, each policyholder has a uniform prior that the incumbent broker, and rival brokers, will use
its leverage over insurers to encourage settlement of non veriﬁable losses.12 If the insurer fails to make a
settlement and the incumbent broker then fails to extract a penalty from the insurer, the policyholder revises
the prior downwards. This posterior is now lower than the common prior for rival brokers and the consumer
switches brokers.
Now some proportion of these policyholders will suﬀer an non veriﬁable loss and the policyholders will
have an expectations that the broker will facilitate a settlement of b∗
br.T h e v a l u e b∗
br is limited by the rents
and the broker is expected to impose a penalty such that the insurer will weakly better oﬀ settling at this
value. We have estimated the penalty under the assumption that all ex post bargaining power lodges with
the policyholder. This is not necessary for the general structure of our results, but it permits considerable
simpliﬁcation. If the insurer fails to make this settlement and the broker fails to extract the penalty, the
aﬀected policyholders cancel their business and switch to another broker. Because the brokers compensation
increases with the number of clients, then the broker has an incentive to present the penalties to the insurer
and enforce them if the settlement is not reached. Anticipating the ex post disposition of the non-veriﬁable
claims, the policyholder’s ex ante problem is to secure, with the help of the broker, an incomplete contract
with explicit and implicit coverage of c∗
br and b∗
br.
Now suppose that the size of the book of business, m, is large such that we can approximate the number of
non-veriﬁable losses occurring in each period by the expected number, mp(1 − q). The incentive constraint
f o rt h ei n s u r e rt op a yt h et r a n s f e rb is then
mp(1 − q)b ≤ m
P − pqc − p(1 − q)b
r
12Recall that we have assumed all non veriﬁable losses to be ex-post insurable. If there also were ex-post uninsurable
losses, the broker would be called to use its judgement to distinguish and to use its hold-up power only for ex-post insurable
losses. Further structure could be added to our model by allowing brokers to penalize policyholders who tried to falsify ex-post
uninsurable claims to appear as though they were insurable.
14where the right hand side represents the future rents for the insurer from retaining the entire book of business.
Assuming policyholders have all the bargaining power, the net premium paid to the insurer is then
P = pqc + p(1 − q)b + p(1 − q)rb.
We observe that the implicit loading, p(1 − q)rb, is smaller than the implicit loading that is needed in
the bilateral relationship without the broker, rb. Ex-ante the policyholder chooses the level of insurance
coverage, c,o ft h ev e r i ﬁable loss and the transfer, b, of the non-veriﬁable loss to maximize expected utility
subject to the premium structure above and the compensation paid to the broker. The compensation
structure is linear in the insurer’s expected proﬁts, i.e.
k = γp(1 − q)rb.
The overall payment for each policyholder can then be written as
ˆ P = P + k = pqc + p(1 − q)b +( 1+γ)p(1 − q)rb.
Deﬁning
ˆ r =( 1+γ)p(1 − q)r
yields
ˆ P = P + k = pqc + p(1 − q)b +ˆ rb.
The premium structure is thus the same as in the bilateral case which leads to results that are qualitatively
equivalent to Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 In the market with the broker, it is optimal for the policyholder to partially insure both types
of losses and to buy more coverage on the veriﬁable than to implicitly generate on non-veriﬁable event, i.e.
b∗
br <c ∗
br <Lfor all r. Furthermore, there exists a critical discount rate ¯ rbr > 0 such that it is optimal to
generate a transfer if the discount rate is below ¯ rbr and not to generate a transfer otherwise, i.e. b∗
br > 0 if
r<¯ rbr and b∗
br =0if r ≥ ¯ rbr.
Next, we compare the optimal transfer b∗
br and coverage c∗
br generated through the broker with the ones
15in a bilateral relationship, b∗ and c∗.W e o b s e r v e t h a t d i ﬀerence is based on a pure price eﬀect. The overall
implicit loading ˆ r is strictly lower than in the bilateral case if and only if
(1 + γ)p(1 − q) < 1.
We thus have to examine the comparative statics of the transfer b and coverage c under changes of the
implicit loading. Insurance can be a Giﬀen good under decreasing absolute risk aversion if the income
eﬀect outweighs the substitution eﬀect. To abstract away from those wealth eﬀects, we assume that the
policyholder’s preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Under this assumption, the
following proposition shows that coverage for both veriﬁable and non-veriﬁable losses can be obtained more
eﬃciently through the broker than under the bilateral case.
Proposition 3 Suppose that policyholder’s preferences exhibit CARA and that (1 + γ)p(1 − q) < 1.T h e n
¯ rbr > ¯ r. Furthermore, b∗
br >b ∗ and c∗
br >c ∗ for all r<¯ rbr and b∗
br = b∗ =0and c∗
br = c∗ for all r ≥ ¯ rbr.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
These results show that the brokers can play an important coordinating mechanism in securing the
incomplete contract. In particular, by pooling risk and using the hold up power form their whole book of
business, the broker can secure implicit coverage for the non-veriﬁable loss on more advantageous terms and
this will lead to a higher values of b∗ and c∗.
5 Summary and Comments on Contingent Commissions
The propositions are summarized in Figure 1. Without brokers, a transfer payment of the non veriﬁable
loss, b∗, is negotiated but it is bounded by the future rents on the policy which might be small. The present
value of these rents is of course interest rate sensitive, and the transfers are diminishing in the interest rate
and eventually disappear. These rents are bestowed on the insurer (even under competition) to create the
hold-up required for the ex post transfer for non veriﬁable losses. The downside to the rents is that the
insurance on non-veriﬁable losses is actuarially unfair and therefore only partially insured, b∗ <L .T h i s
creates a negative spill-over eﬀect on insurance of veriﬁable losses. To reduce the gap in marginal utilities,
it is optimal to also partially insure veriﬁable losses, c∗ <L . As explicit insurance is relatively cheaper than
16b*(r)
c*br(r)
c*(r) b*br(r)
r r
coverage
br r
L
Figure 1:
17implicit insurance, more contractual insurance is bought than implicitly generated through rents, c∗ <b ∗.
With brokers, the “renewal rights” to a book of business are transferred to the broker under its brokerage
contract with the insurer. This magniﬁes the hold-up which results in larger negotiated transfers of non
veriﬁable (but ex post insurable) losses as shown by b∗
br. Moreover, the interest domain over which transfers
are made, is expanded from ¯ r to ¯ rbr. Not only do brokers enable more complete transfers of the non
veriﬁable loss, they permit an eﬃciency gain though diversiﬁcation. This arises because the brokers can
use the future rents from policyholders not having a loss, to expand its hold-up on behalf of those who do
suﬀer a loss. The increased hold-up power reduces the implicit premium loading and thereby increases the
transfers for non-veriﬁable losses, b∗
br >b ∗. This, in turn, reduces the negative spill-over eﬀect — the spread
in marginal utilities is lower — and increases the transfers for veriﬁable losses, c∗
br >c ∗.T h u s , w i t h b r o k e r s ,
more contractual insurance for veriﬁable losses is bought and this is accomplished with lower transaction
costs imposed on the extra-contractual market for non-veriﬁable losses.
The role deﬁned here for brokers raises some topical challenges. Brokers have recently been under a
well publicized attack from the attorney general of New York, Elliot Spitzer. This attack has decimated
the value of the world’s largest broker and largest insurer, forced the resignation of both their CEO’s, led
to several criminal indictments, and has resulted in all four of the largest brokers abandoning a major
form of compensation. At the heart of the issue is the compensation structure for brokers. In addition
to commissions (proportional to premiums), brokers often receive “contingent commissions”. These are
payments by the insurer to the broker based on some measures of the book of business transacted. Most
common are contingent commissions based on the proﬁt of the broker’s book, but volume based contingent
commissions and renewal based structures also are found. The allegation of Spitzer, is as follows. The
broker is an agent of the policyholder. Therefore, broker compensation linked to the welfare of the insurer
must compromise its obligations to its principle (the policyholder).
Our results challenge this simpliﬁed conclusion. We have shown that brokers can beneﬁt policyholders
by expanding the market for non veriﬁable losses. To do so, they must exercise a credible threat to
sanction insurers that do not respond to such losses. This is achieved by constructing a similar incentive
compatibility constraint for the insurer and broker such that they both gain from the ex post transfer, i.e.
that the broker shares in the future rents from the book it holds with the insurer. In our formal model,
the broker compensation is linear in the rents. This contradicts Spitzer’s blanket assertion that “kickbacks”
18from insurers are inimical to the interests of policyholders. While, of course, there are other dimensions
to the contractual relationships not addressed here, and compensation also must address these, our model
shows that contingent fees can lead to an expansion of insurance markets to include informal coverage of
non veriﬁable losses and this is beneﬁcial to policyholders.13
AA p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The policyholder solves the following program
max
c,b
E [u(w)] = (1 − p)u(w0 − P)+pqu(w0 − P − L + c)+p(1 − q)u(w0 − P − L + b)
subject to
P = pqc + p(1 − q)b + rb.
The ﬁrst derivative of expected utility with respect to b is
∂E[u(w)]
∂b
=
·
−(1 − p)(p(1 − q)+r)u0 (w0 − P) − pq(p(1 − q)+r)u0 (w0 − P − L + c)
+p(1 − q)(1− p(1 − q) − r)u0 (w0 − P − L + b)
¸
.
The second derivative is negative and expected utility is thus globally concave in b for all levels of c.T h e
FOC thus determines the unique global maximum b∗ = b∗ (c). Evaluating the ﬁrst derivative at b = L yields
∂E[u(w)]
∂b
|b=L = −ru0 (w0 − P)+pq (p(1 − q)+r)(u0 (w0 − P) − u0 (w0 − P − L + c)) < 0
for all c ∈ [0,L], i.e. b∗ (c) <Lfor all c ∈ [0,L] and therefore b∗ <L . Evaluating the ﬁrst derivative at
b =0yields
∂E[u(w)]
∂b
|b=0 =
·
−(1 − p)(p(1 − q)+r)u0 (w0 − P) − pq (p(1 − q)+r)u0 (w0 − P − L + c)
+p(1 − q)(1− p(1 − q) − r)u0 (w0 − P − L)
¸
.
For any r ≥ 1 − p(1 − q),w eh a v e
∂E[u(w)]
∂b
|b=0 < 0
for all c ∈ [0,L], i.e. b∗ (c)=0for all r ≥ 1 − p(1 − q).F o r r =0we get
∂E[u(w)]
∂b
|b=0,r=0 =
·
(1 − p)p(1 − q)(u0 (w0 − P − L) − u0 (w0 − P))
+pqp(1 − q)(u0 (w0 − P − L) − u0 (w0 − P − L + c))
¸
> 0
13There are other beneﬁts from proﬁt based contingent commissions. If brokers have better information about policyholder
risk than insurers, brokers can send a signal to insurers about risk type and thereby mitigate adverse selection. Proﬁt sharing
with insurers will render the signal credible. See David J. Cummins and Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance
Intermediaries, American Insurance Association, 2005.
19for all c ∈ [0,L], i.e. b∗ (c) > 0 for r =0 .D i ﬀerentiating
∂E[u(w)]
∂b |b=0 with respect to r yields
∂
∂r
∂E[u(w)]
∂b
|b=0 =( −(1 − p)u0 (w0 − P) − pqu0 (w0 − P − L + c) − p(1 − q)u0 (w0 − P − L)) < 0.
This implies that for each c there exists a unique ¯ r(c) > 0 such that b∗ (c) > 0 for all r<¯ r(c) and b∗ (c)=0
for all r ≥ ¯ r(c).
The ﬁrst derivative of expected utility with respect to c is
∂E[u(w)]
∂c
= pq(−(1 − p)u0 (w0 − P)+( 1− pq)u0 (w0 − P − L + c) − p(1 − q)u0 (w0 − P − L + b)).
The second derivative is negative and expected utility therefore globally concave in c for all levels of b.T h e
FOC thus determines the unique global maximum c∗ = c∗ (b). Evaluating the ﬁrst derivative at c = L yields
∂E[u(w)]
∂c
|c=L = pqp(1 − q)(u0 (w0 − P) − u0 (w0 − P − L + b)).
As 0 ≤ b∗ <L ,w eh a v e
∂E[u(w)]
∂c |c=L < 0 and thus c∗ <L .E v a l u a t i n g t h e ﬁrst derivative at c = b yields
∂E[u(w)]
∂c
|c=b = pq (1 − p)(u0 (w0 − P − L + b) − u0 (w0 − P)).
As 0 ≤ b∗ <L ,w eh a v e
∂E[u(w)]
∂c |c=b > 0 and thus c∗ >b ∗. Finally, deﬁne ¯ r =¯ r(c∗).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The FOCs for b∗ (r) and c∗ (r) are
·
−(1 − p)(p(1 − q)+r)u0 (w0 − P (r)) − pq (p(1 − q)+r)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r))
+p(1 − q)(1− p(1 − q) − r)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r))
¸
=0
and
−(1 − p)u0 (w0 − P (r)) + (1 − pq)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r)) − p(1 − q)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r)) = 0
where
P (r)=pqc∗ (r)+p(1 − q)b∗ (r)+rb∗ (r).
Implicitly diﬀerentiating both FOCs with respect to r yields

   

−P0 (r)
½
−(1 − p)(p(1 − q)+r)u00 (w0 − P (r)) − pq (p(1 − q)+r)u00 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r))
+p(1 − q)(1− p(1 − q) − r)u00 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r))
¾
−c∗0 (r)pq (p(1 − q)+r)u00 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r)) − pqu0 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r))
+b∗0 (r)p(1 − q)(1− p(1 − q) − r)u00 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r))
−(1 − p)u0 (w0 − P (r)) − p(1 − q)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r))

   

=0
and

 −P0 (r)
½
−(1 − p)u00 (w0 − P (r)) + (1 − pq)u00 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r))
−p(1 − q)u00 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r))
¾
+c∗0 (r)(1− pq)u00 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r)) − b∗0 (r)p(1 − q)u00 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r))

 =0
20Under the constant coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion Ra a n du s i n gt h eF O C sw ed e r i v e
·
Rac∗0 (r)pq (p(1 − q)+r)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r))
−Rab∗0 (r)p(1 − q)(1− p(1 − q) − r)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r)) − u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r))
¸
=0
and
b∗0 (r)p(1 − q)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r)) = c∗0 (r)(1− pq)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r))
The last equation implies
b∗0 (r)=c∗0 (r)
(1 − pq)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + c∗ (r))
p(1 − q)u0 (w0 − P (r) − L + b∗ (r))
and
sign(b∗0 (r)) = sign(c∗0 (r)).
Substitution into the ﬁrst equation yields
c∗0 (r)=−
1
Ra (1 − p − r)
We thus deduce that
sign(b∗0 (r)) = sign(c∗0 (r)) < 0 for all r<1 − p
sign(b∗0 (r)) = sign(c∗0 (r)) > 0 for all r>1 − p.
As b∗0 (¯ r) < 0,w eh a v e¯ r<1 − p and thus sign(b∗0 (r)) = sign(c∗0 (r)) < 0 for all r<¯ r.
The implicit rate of interest in the market with the broker
ˆ r =( 1+γ)p(1 − q)r
is lower than the one in the bilateral case which completes the proof.
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